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In this work, our goal is to answer if Spanish students are differently located 
among schools depending on their standard of living. In other words, we analyse 
the segregation by income in schools in Spain. 
To do so, we use data from Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) databases. We consider all autonomous communities and types of school 
of Spain for year 2018. Although PISA does not collect data about the income 
level of students, it creates an index which measures the socioeconomic status 
of pupils. We use that index as a proxy of the income level for the analysis. 
This index is standardized by PISA, therefore we use the Variance Separation 
Index (VSI) to measure the segregation, that is an invariant and absolute index. 
The results show that there is low income segregation level among the schools 
of Spain for 2018. We find the largest segregation level by income in schools in 
Madrid and the lowest in Cantabria. We also analyse the contribution of the type 
of school -public school, private-government school and private-government 
school- and we find that the school type may significate a big part of the school 
income segregation for some regions. Finally, we examine the segregation due 
to the language type of school in the Basque Country and we find that it 
represents around 28% of the total segregation. 
Keywords: Segregation; PISA database; ESCS; Variance Separation Index.  
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The Cambridge Dictionary defines segregation as “the act of keeping one 
person or thing separate from another person or thing”. The goal of this work is 
to analyse the segregation by income in Spanish schools. This topic is a recurring 
in papers (Rubia, 2013) and press (Hernández, 2019 for La Vanguardia) in Spain 
and the reason is obvious; it causes concern in the population for the negative 
effects it may cause, as the achievement gaps it may cause between advantaged 
and disadvantaged students, Owens (2018). However, this disruption has existed 
in the whole world for decades, see Douglas and Denton (1988) for instance. 
Before delving into the analysis, there are two notions we have to understand 
about segregation. The first one is that there are different types of segregation, 
according to the criterion used to classify the groups, Reskin (1993). For instance, 
ethnic segregation means that demographic groups are classified according to 
ethnicity. Likewise, when groups are classified by gender, it refers to gender 
segregation. These examples have something in common, and it is that there is 
no natural order of groups.  In other cases, individuals could be classified 
according to an ordered criterion, such as the educational level of the parents, 
depending if they have completed the primary, secondary or higher education. In 
these cases, it would not be correct to treat groups symmetrically. 
In the same vein, we could also distinguish segregation by income. Even if this 
is a very important topic, there is wide disagreement about how to measure the 
income segregation, because the variable used to classify people is not discrete 
as the ones aforementioned above. There had been proposed many indices, 
some of them are based on ethnic segregation indices, like Jahn, Schmid, & 
Schrag (1947) with the Dissimilarity Index. But some other indices treated income 
as a cardinal variable, like the Neighbourhood Sorting Index of Jargowsky (1996). 
Another way to measure income segregation is to stablish a threshold or a 




poverty line to create two income status groups, such as in Fong & Shibuya 
(2000), or to divide the groups by income percentiles, Watson (2009), but due to 
income is a dynamic variable, it is hard to control the distribution of the groups. 
And more importantly, the resulting segregation orders do not satisfy continuity, 
which is a basic property for any income segregation order. 
In this work, we use the properties proposed by Lasso de la Vega & Volij 
(2019), leveraging that they “adapt the properties of standard ethnic segregation 
measures to the new context and investigate their implications”, instead of 
adapting an existing ethnic segregation to the context of income segregation. 
Through that method, we can see how the proposed properties characterize an 
absolute index of income segregation, which we introduce afterwards. 
The second notion is the perception about the income segregation and its 
relation to income inequality. As we work about schools, lets explain this 
approach using schools as example: 
Suppose two districts X and Y. Each of the districts have two schools A and B 
as follows. 
 
In both districts poor people attend school A and rich pupils attend school B, 
so it could be thought that in both situations the segregation by income is equal 
and maximum, according to the Scale Interpretability proposed by Reardon 
(2011). Nevertheless, the idea about income segregation we are working at is 
different. We not only measure the scale interpretability but also the income 
inequality between students. Therefore, for us in district Y the income segregation 
is higher as the income difference in schools is much higher. We will consolidate 
this idea with the axioms we will explain later. Let’s see another example about 
the difference of the pure segregation and the income segregation we propose 
along this work: 
 
District X 10€ 100€ 
A 100 0 
B 0 100 
District Y 10€ 1.000.000€ 
A 100 0 
B 0 100 





Once again, some people could consider that there is pure and equal 
segregation in the schools of the two districts, as the rich and poor people are 
separated, Reardon (2011). However, we consider that segregation in district Y 
is larger, since the income is more distributed, in the same way as Denton & 
Massey (1988). These two examples show the main difference between the 
segregation by income and the ethnic segregation, and detail how our index 
works. 
For our analysis, we use data from PISA. PISA is a worldwide study by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which 
includes the evaluation of educational systems by measuring 15-year-old school 
pupils’ performance on science, mathematics and reading of both member and 
non-member nations, Schleicher (2019). It was first performed in 2000 and then 
repeated every three years. Although there is no data about the income level of 
pupils’ families, this programme creates the indicator of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Status (ESCS) index1, that provides a comprehensive measure of 
student socioeconomic background according to the OECD, Rutkowski & 
Rutkowski (2013). In that way, they allocate a value to each student, that we use 
as a proxy of the income level. This value is standardized, in order to get a mean 
of 0 and standard deviation of 1 for the OECD countries, for that reason we use 
an absolute and invariant index2. 
The goal of our work is to analyse school income segregation in Spain and its 
regions as measured by the VSI and using the ESCS index as a proxy of income. 
We further examine to what extent the type of school, Public, Private-government 
and Private-independent schools is a source of segregation. In addition, we 
analyse if in the Basque Country the attendance of students to schools classified 
according to the language model contributes to the school segregation. 
                                            
1 Check Section 3 for more details. 
2 Check Section 2 for more details. 
District X 200€ 300€ 
A 100 0 
B 0 100 
District Y 100€ 200€ 300€ 400€ 
A 50 50 0 0 
B 0 0 50 50 




The work is organized as follows. The next Section introduces the index we 
use for the analysis and the list of axioms fulfilled by the index. After that, in 
Section 3 we describe the data and its characteristics. Section 4 shows the results 






























2. Variance Separation Index and Income Segregation Axioms 
As we have explained in the previous section, the ESCS value is standardized 
by PISA, for that reason we use an absolute and invariant segregation index. This 
index is the Variance Separation Index (VSI) characterized by Lasso de la Vega 
& Volij, (2019). This index measures income segregation through the variance 
between schools. 
A segregation index S defines a segregation order ≽ as follows. For any two 
districts X,Y, 𝑋 ≽ 𝑌 if and only if 𝑆(𝑋) ≥ 𝑆(𝑌).  
For any district X= {c1, …, ck} where {c1, …, ck} is the list of schools in the 




∑ 𝑛𝑐(𝜇𝑐 − 𝜇𝑋)
2
𝑐∈𝑋  , 
where 𝑛𝑐 is the total enrolment of school 𝑐𝑐 and 𝜇𝑐 is the mean income of the 
school. In the same way, 𝑛𝑋 represents the total attendance of the district X and 
𝜇𝑋 its mean income. 
Now we present some properties that are desirable for an income segregation 
index. We begin with three fundamental axioms that transmit the idea of what a 
district means to be segregated. Particularly, these axioms express the idea that 
there cannot exist segregation unless there are at least two schools with different 
income distributions. 
For any district X, R(X) is the district obtained from reallocating students so 
that the schools keep their initial enrolment while sharing the same relative 
income distribution. In other words, R(X) district does not have any segregation 
as all the schools have the same income distribution. 




The first axiom Equal Allocation Property (EAP) demands that if students are 
reallocated with the purpose of all schools to have the same income distributions, 
the segregation does not increase. That is, EAP requires that for any district 
𝑋, 𝑋 ≽ 𝑅(𝑋). It does not talk about different allocations of students across income 
groups nor about different number of schools. 
The second axiom recognizes a class of districts all of whose members display 
the same level of segregation. The Equivalence of Single-School Districts (SSD) 
stands that if X and Y are single-school districts, then X ∼ Y. 
The next axiom deals with simple districts and egalitarian districts. Simple 
districts are those with no income variation within schools. That is, all pupils that 
attend the same school belong to the same income group, while egalitarian 
districts are known to have an egalitarian income distribution if all pupils have the 
same income. Egalitarian districts are equally segregated and less segregated 
than any other simple district, unless it is an egalitarian simple district. 
The Equivalence of Uniform Distribution Districts (UDD) assumes two simple 
districts X and Y with the same income and number of pupils. Assume also that 
X has an egalitarian income distribution. Then Y ∼ X if and only if Y also has an 
egalitarian income distribution. 
In consequence of these two axioms, the egalitarian districts and the single-
school districts are equally segregated. 
The next two axioms require invariance to certain changes in units of 
measurement. The first one expresses that changes in population that leave the 
relative attendances of the schools unchanged do not affect segregation. 
Population Homogeneity (PH) states that for any district X and scalar λ>0, X∼ λX. 
 
The λX district is equally segregated as X district. 
School 100€ 200€ 300€ 400€ 
A 120λ 50λ 30λ 20λ 
B 30λ 30λ 30λ 30λ 
C 10λ 20λ 50λ 100λ 




The next axiom affirms that changes in household incomes that do not differ 
in students’ absolute income do not affect segregation. In other words, if 
household’s income increases by the same constant amount, then the income 
segregation should not change. Invariance to Uniform Income Additions (IUIA) 
says that for any district X, and for any positive scalar λ, X ∼ X + λ. 
School 100€+λ€ 200€+λ€ 300€+λ€ 400€+λ€ 
A 120 50 30 20 
B 30 30 30 30 
C 10 20 50 100 
 
VSI satisfies the IUIA because it is an absolute index, as well as it satisfies the 
previous axioms (Lasso de la Vega & Volij, 2019). The next two axioms talk about 
the independence and separability. These axioms require segregation 
comparisons to be independent of irrelevant sub-districts. 
For the first one, let’s suppose a school district divided into two sub-districts. 
Let’s also assume that a reorganization within each sub-district reduces 
segregation in both of them. For that, we should expect that the reorganization 
does not result in a higher districtwide segregation. If this would occur, we would 
perceive a rather perverse outcome of an otherwise well-intended policy. The 
next axiom requires that those outcomes never happen. 
Independence (IND) requires the same population and total income for any 
two districts X and Y, and for any arbitrary district Z, X ≽ Y ⇔ X ⊎ Z ≽ Y ⊎ Z. This 
guarantees that any policy to reduce income segregation in a sub-district does 
not result in a higher districtwide segregation. The VSI satisfies IND. Check Lasso 
de la Vega & Volij (2019) for more details. 
The next axiom although is similar, is different from independence. Consider 
now again a district composed of two sub-districts. Assume that a policy is applied 
to sub-district Y, transforming it into Z. Moreover, assume that the policy left 
attendance unchanged. The axiom affirms that even or not this policy increases 
the districtwide segregation, it does not depend on the segregation within sub-
district X. 




Separability (SEP) states that for any three districts X, Y, Z such that nY = nZ, 
X⊎Y ≽ X⊎Z ⇔ R(X) ⊎ Y ≽ R(X) ⊎ Z. 
To finish, we have an axiom that requires similar districts to have similar levels 
of segregation. The Continuity (CONT) property says: let X= {c1,…, cK} be a 
district and let Xn={cn1,…, cnK}, for n=1, 2,… be a sequence of districts such that 
cnk →ck for k=1,… ,K. For any district Y, if Xn≥Y for all n, then X≥Y, and if Y≥Xn 
for all n, then Y≥X. 
VSI satisfies these last two axioms and all previous ones, what we consider 
valid for our analysis. In addition, VSI is the only index that satisfies all the 


























For our analysis, we use data from PISA. As mentioned in the introduction, 
PISA creates the ESCS index to measure the socioeconomic background of 
pupils, because they do not collect data about the income level. “In many 
countries, the quality of the education a student acquires can still best be 
predicted by the student’s or his or her school’s socioeconomic background”, 
Schleicher (2019). 
PISA examines the home possessions index for the ESCS. This index is a 
composite score based on three indicators: highest parental occupation (HISEI), 
parental education (PAREDINT), and home possessions (HOMEPOS) including 
books in the home, PISA (2018, p. 39). According to PISA’s technical report 
“Scaling procedures and construct validation of context questionnaire data” 
(chapter 16), these are the compositions of the three indicators: 
• HISEI: This indicator gathers both fathers and mother´s occupational data. 
This data was collected through two ISCO coded options (OCOD1, OCOD2). 
 
• PAREDINT: Pupils answered to the questions about their parent’s 
education level. 
 
• HOMEPOS: Students answered to 16 household item questions about 
their home, including three country-specific household items that are seen as 
local measures of family wealth within the country’s context. Moreover, pupils 
specified the amount of possessions and books at home. From those answers, 
there were derived five indices:  
o Family wealth possessions (WEALTH) 
o Cultural possessions (CULTPOSS) 
o Home educational resources (HEDRES) 




o  ICT resources (ICTRES) 
o Home possessions (HOMEPOS). 
HOMEPOS is a summary index of all household and possession items. 
The reason to use these three indicators is that the socio-economic status is 
known to be based on education, occupational status and income, Schleicher 
(2019). Given that PISA does not provide any income measure, the existence of 
household items has been used as a proxy for family wealth. Assuming that, we 
use this index as a proxy of the income level for our analysis. 
For some students who had missing data on one component, PISA imputed 
the missing variable. The other two variables were used to predict the missing 
one, using a regression by adding a random component to the predicted value. If 
there were more than one missing value, ESCS was not computed and it was 
assigned a missing value for the index. After the imputation, the three 
components were standardised for OECD countries with an OECD mean zero 
and a standard deviation of one, OECD (s.f.) 
We work with the ESCS that was constructed as the arithmetic mean of the 
three indicators after their standardization, Avvisati et al. (2019). For that reason, 
we use an absolute index like the VSI in order to measure income segregation. 
Spain has 17 autonomy provinces and two autonomous cities, Ceuta and 
Melilla. For our analysis, we use the PISA database of 2018 about Spanish 
schools and students. In the database we can find different variables and the 
answers to questionnaires, all collected in the codebook and the questionnaire 
files published by PISA (all links and documents listed at the bibliography 
section). 
There is a questionnaire directed towards students and another aimed at the 
schools, which is answered by teachers or personal of the high school. PISA 
sends one of the questionnaires to some schools and other questionnaires to 
other ones, and after that they collect the answers and weigh them in order to 
cover the population of that school, region or whatever corresponds, PISA (2018). 
The student’s database includes data about students, but the only data we 
need is the ESCS index measurement of each student. The schools’ database 




includes more interesting variables. Here there is the list of variables we consider 





72400 is the value assigned for Spain and then we find 










School Ownership: Value of 1 for Private independent 
schools, value of 2 for Private-Government schools and 3 




Schooling available to students in their location: 1= two or 
more other schools in the area that compete for students; 
2=Only one other school that compete; 3=No other school 
that compete for students in the area 
 
W_SCHGRNRABWT Adjusted school base weight 
Students Variables 
ESCS Index of economic, social and cultural status 
 
 
This database works with sample weights. All our analysis is carried out using 















In this section we illustrate some descriptive statistics and the VSI results for 
Spain in 2018. 
We start the analysis with the PISA indicator of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Status index. In Table 1 below we can find the mean and the standard deviation 
of the ESCS for every region. 
TABLE 1: ESCS by Regions in 2018. 
Region ESCS Mean ESCS Std. Dev. 
Andalusia -0.32 1.04 
Aragon 0.14 0.98 
Asturias -0.05 1.02 
Balearic Islands -0.08 0.99 
Canary Islands -0.38 1.01 
Cantabria 0.02 0.91 
Castile and Leon -0.002 0.99 
Castile La Mancha -0.24 1.06 
Catalonia 0.10 0.97 
Extremadura -0.34 1.04 
Galicia -0.06 1.00 
La Rioja -0.12 1.00 
Madrid 0.18 1.02 
Murcia -0.34 1.07 
Navarre 0.04 1.00 
Basque Country 0.14 0.88 
Valencian Community -0.18 1.03 
Ceuta -0.55 1.11 
Melilla -0.55 1.25 
Spain -0.09 1.03 
Source: Own elaboration with data from PISA (2018). 




Remember that PISA standardizes the ESCS indicator so that the mean for 
the OECD countries takes a value equal to 0 and a standard deviation equal to 
1. So, from that point on, negative values mean that the region or country is 
socioeconomically under the OECD mean level. The ESCS values are between 
-1 and 1. Hence, we can see that Spain is socioeconomically under the OECD 
mean level. 13 out of 19 regions have negative values (68.42%), but Ceuta and 
Melilla for example have a low weight, that is why Spain is still close to the zero 
mean. Spain also has a large standard deviation. That means that the values are 
not concentrated near the mean. 
If we go over the regions in a general view, we can observe that all have large 
standard deviations. That means that all the regions have large differences 
between the most socioeconomic advantaged student and the less ones. 
The most iconic regions, Madrid and Catalonia, have 0.18 and 0.10 positive 
values respectively. However, there are more regions with positive and large 
values, as Graph 1 shows. 
Graph 1: ESCS mean by Regions in Spain in 2018. 












ESCS mean by Regions in Spain




So many regions have the ESCS mean over Spain mean, but only 6 of them 
have positive mean, all in the north half of the country. This could be for many 
reasons, such as the differences in GDP, income and employment in absolute 
and per capita terms, Caballero (2019). Likewise, the regions in the worst 
situation are in the South, or even farther like Canary Islands or Ceuta and Melilla. 
Now we check whether those ESCS differences have an effect on school 
segregation. We use the Variance Separation Index to measure the school 
segregation. Table 2 below shows the results. 
 





ESCS indicator; Variance 
ESCS (total inequality)  
 
Andalusia 0.2316 (21%) 1.0947 
Aragon 0.1757 (18%) 0.9757 
Asturias 0.2541 (25%) 1.0369 
Balearic Islands 0.1888 (20%) 0.9673 
Canary Islands 0.2242 (22%) 1.0282 
Cantabria 0.1383 (17%) 0.8285 
Castile and Leon 0.1629 (17%) 0.9820 
Castile La Mancha 0.2207 (20%) 1.1289 
Catalonia 0.2383 (25%) 0.9393 
Extremadura 0.1885 (18%) 1.0637 
Galicia 0.1749 (18%) 0.9962 
La Rioja 0.1607 (16%) 0.9990 
Madrid 0.3267 (32%) 1.0268 
Murcia 0.2375 (20%) 1.1596 
Navarre 0.2024 (20%) 1.0186 
Basque Country 0.1627 (21%) 0.7823 
Valencian Community 0.1984 (19%) 1.0394 
Ceuta 0.2748 (22%) 1.2328 
Melilla 0.4660 (30%) 1.5629 
Spain 0.2706 (25%) 1.0627 
Source: Own elaboration with data from PISA (2018). 
The second column in Table 2 shows income segregation disaggregated by 
regions jointly with the percentage of total inequality captured by the segregation 




in parenthesis. As can be seen in the table, the mean of Spain is 0.27, which 
does not show too many school income segregation. Madrid and Melilla have a 
value larger than the mean, but Melilla has a low weight to be considered in an 
analysis. Catalonia has a 0.24 income segregation value, that is quite low to be 
Catalonia. We find the lowest income segregation in Cantabria.  
According to the percentages, the 25% of the total school inequality is due to 
income segregation. In general, all the regions are between 0.15 and 0.30 points 
more or less, what means the income segregation to be low. We find Madrid with 
the largest percentage (32%), followed by Catalonia and Asturias, with the 25% 
each. 
The difference between the income segregation and the total inequality 
corresponds to the inequality within schools by region. With these results, we can 
conclude whether there is income inequality within schools. In this case, the 
variance is much higher than between schools. This means that the main source 
of the variance in the ESCS indicator is the within-schools. We can then conclude 
that students are not separated by schools by the socioeconomic status, but they 
are mixed among them. 
The variance of Spain is almost three times larger in terms of within schools 
than between them. Only Madrid, Andalusia and Murcia have larger values, but 
two of those have a high weight in the country’s population. 
In the last column, we find the ESCS indicator variance by region. Through 
these results, we conclude the inequality by income in the regions. We use this 
to conclude the segregation by socioeconomic status in schools in general terms 
for the region. 
While the ESCS variance is 1.0627, there are some regions whose variance 
is over that number. In first places we find the two autonomous cities Ceuta and 
Melilla, whose ESCS level is -0.55 in both cases. Those cities besides having the 
worst ESCS situations they also have the largest variation in the index. This 
means that there are some students whose socioeconomical situation is even 
worse than the mean of the region. 




We can extrapolate this idea to other regions like the Basque Country, which 
is the region with the less ESCS variation. In this case, the total variation is 0.782, 
that is composed by 0.16 variation between schools and 0.62 within schools. In 
the case of this region, the ESCS mean is 0.14, with the lowest standard 
deviation. In general, in the region the socioeconomic level is better than in other 
regions and there is low segregation level by income between schools. 
Once we have analysed the school segregation by regions, we go deeper in 
the analysis and check the segregation by type of schools. In Spain we 
distinguish three type of schools: Public schools, Private-government schools 
and Private-independent schools.  
Our goal is to observe the distribution to conclude whether this distribution 
affects the segregation by income, that is, whether the type of school separates 
richer pupils from poorest ones. It would be understandable to think that the less 
income the student has, it will study in a public school. Likewise, richer pupils are 
expected to go to private independent schools. The following table 3 shows the 
student distribution in Spanish schools. 
 
TABLE 3: Student distribution in Spanish schools in 2018: 






























































































































































































Source: Own elaboration with data from PISA (2018). 
 
This table may insinuate that in some regions there are no private-independent 
school, but by a long shot, that is because this database is made by sample 
weights. In those regions, PISA has not coincided in private-independent schools, 
that is why we have no data. 




Looking the results obtained for the whole country, we can observe that more 
than the 70% of the students attend public schools, while the 23.87% go to private 
government-dependence schools and 5,78% to private-independent schools. We 
also had “no-response” data because this PISA questionnaire was answered by 
15 years old students. That is why we must understand that some of them might 
not know exactly what type of schools they belong to. Nevertheless, we have 
dropped all missing data for the analysis. 
The Basque Country is the region where less students attend public schools, 
only the 50%. In the Basque Country also, we find the larger private-government 
dependence school attendance, with the 49.46% of the students of the region. 
Whereas in Madrid, we find the highest private-independent school attending 
rate, 18.41%, far above the rest of regions. 
Now that we know the distribution of pupils, let’s examine the ESCS by types 
of school and regions in Spain. It will be interesting to conclude whether the 
socioeconomic status is related with the school type attendance. 



















Andalusia -0.42 1.07 0.01 0.87 - - 
Aragon -0.15 0.99 0.26 0.90 0.51 0.86 
Asturias -0.22 1.00 0.39 0.92 1.00 0.53 
Balearic Islands -0.22 0.99 0.20 0.91 0.31 0.85 
Canary Islands -0.57 0.97 0.13 0.89 0.34 0.88 
Cantabria -0.09 0.89 0.36 0.90 -0.05 0.70 
Castile and 
Leon 
-0.11 1.00 0.19 0.94 0.45 0.82 
Castile La 
Mancha 
-0.39 1.04 0.43 0.90 0.41 0.94 
Catalonia -0.09 0.98 0.37 0.81 0.98 0.68 
Extremadura -0.48 1.02 0.02 0.99 - - 




Galicia -0.18 1.01 0.11 0.84 0.81 0.88 
La Rioja -0.30 0.99 0.13 0.96 - - 
Madrid -0.13 1.02 0.25 0.91 0.92 0.65 
Murcia -0.49 1.08 0.06 0.96 - - 
Navarre -0.22 1.04 0.44 0.82 - - 
Basque Country -0.04 0.90 0.29 0.84 - - 
Valencian 
Community 
-0.42 1.00 0.19 0.86 0.56 0.89 
Ceuta -0.78 1.06 0.19 0.92 - - 
Melilla -0.70 1.22 0.65 0.73 - - 
Spain -0.29 1.03 0.22 0.86 0.76 0.79 
Source: Own elaboration with data from PISA (2018). 
 
Public schools have negative values for all regions. That means that the 
students of public schools are in mean socioeconomically disadvantaged in 
comparison with the OECD mean. For private-government schools, the ESCS 
results are all positive, some of them far from the zero mean. The mean for Spain 
is 0.22, which means that students of private-government schools tend to be 
socioeconomically advantaged with respect to the OECD mean. 
At last, we observe that pupils of private-independent schools are much more 
socioeconomically advantaged, as the ESCS mean of Spain is 0.76, being 1 the 
maximum. Therefore, we could conclude that in mean there are socioeconomical 
differences between students from different type of schools. 
On the other hand, we observe that the standard deviation of the variance 
index is larger in public schools and lower in private-independent schools. This 
means that there is more within-school segregation in public schools than in 
private-independent schools. 
At last, and before analysing these results through a graphic, we have to point 
out that Cantabria has a -0.05 ESCS mean value for private-independent schools. 




There can be several reasons for this, but as we have no additional data about 
this issue, we cannot state anything. 
In the following Graph 2, we do not only see the ESCS mean evolution but also 
the relation between ESCS region mean and ESCS region mean by school type. 
Graph 2: ESCS mean in Spain by regions and type of school in 2018. 
Source: Own elaboration with data from PISA (2018). 
Blue columns are the ESCS mean by regions. That shows what we have seen 
in the previous Graph 1. Next to those, we find the orange columns, which 
represent the ESCS mean of public schools. We can observe the negative 
tendency they have for the less ESCS region mean. There are some exceptions 
like the Basque Country, Catalonia, Cantabria, Castile and Leon and Galicia. 
Those regions’ public school ESCS mean is larger than the expected value 
considering the negative tendency. Nevertheless, they all still are negative 
values. 
The next grey columns show the private-government schools’ ESCS mean, 
which has no continuity though the graph. That is, it is not related to the region’s 
ESCS mean. Some regions have larger values and others lowers. 




At last, we find the yellow columns, that symbolizes the ESCS mean in private-
independent schools. It is more complicated to conclude a tendency due to not 
all regions have private-independent school data. These values are expected to 
be the highest ones, but we can clearly see that not always is like that. In 
Cantabria and Castile la Mancha, the private-government school ESCS mean 
value is larger. 
In the following Table 5 we find results of the income segregation according to 
the type of schools and its implication in the total Income Segregation. In other 
words, in the following table we find whether students are segregated by income 
among type of schools and how much of this segregation explains the total school 
segregation. 
Table 5: Income Segregation between type of schools in Spain in 2018. 
Region 
Income Segregation 
according to type of 
schools 
 
% of the total Income 
Segregation 
 
Andalusia 0.0344 14.85 
Aragon 0.0474 26.99 
Asturias 0.1292 50.83 
Balearic Islands 0.0421 22.30 
Canary Islands 0.1179 52.58 
Cantabria 0.0366 26.47 
Castile and Leon 0.0284 17.47 
Castile La Mancha 0.1375 62.32 
Catalonia 0.0889 37.29 
Extremadura 0.0463 24.56 
Galicia 0.0622 35.58 
La Rioja 0.0358 22.29 
Madrid 0.0753 23.06 
Murcia 0.0582 24.51 
Navarre 0.0813 40.15 
Basque Country 0.0206 12.67 
Valencian Community 0.1044 52.63 
Ceuta 0.1789 65.09 
Melilla 0.3450 74.03 
Spain 0.0931 34.40 
Source: Own elaboration with data from PISA (2018). 




The second column exhibits the segregation between type of schools, which 
are the public school, the private government-dependence school and the private 
independence school. 
The results show that in some cases the type of school is not relevant for the 
segregation between type of schools, while it is for other cases. Let’s see that in 
regions as the Basque Country, Andalusia or Castile and Leon the segregation 
by type of school does not even suppose the 20% of the income school 
segregation. However, in Valencian Community, Castile La Mancha or Asturias 
it signifies more than the 50% of the total income school segregation. 
To finish with the analysis, we test whether the language and the type of school 
are relevant in the income segregation for the Basque Country. We do this 
analysis for the Basque Country because the language may be significant for 
students and their parents when deciding where they study. In the Basque 
Country the culture is very important and there are two types of schools in respect 
of the language: AB model that mixes Spanish and Basque languages and the D 
model, that teaches only in Basque except the Spanish language subject. In the 
next Table 6 we find results about the type of schools mentioned above in the 
work and the type of language of the teaching. 















Public, AB 24,922 -0.5846 
0.0460063 0.2828 







Source: Own elaboration with data from PISA (2018). 
 




In the Column 2 we find the number of students that belong to each type of 
school. We distinguish four different school type here, depending if they are 
private-government or public schools and in the language they teach. We can 
see that there are more students for the D model schools, being the Public D 
model school the one with the most of students. The Public AD has a low 
participation in relative terms. 
The Column 3 shows the ESCS mean for each type of school. We can easily 
see that public schools have in mean negative values and private-government 
schools positive and larger values. Moreover, D model schools have larger values 
than AB model schools. 
The next Column 4 shows the income segregation level according to language 
and type of schools. We can see that this value represents the 28%, as the last 
Column 5 shows, of the whole region’s income segregation. It could be 
considered that is significant the type and the school language to explain the 
income segregation in the Basque Country. 
The next and the last Table 7 shows the same results but summarized to the 
language of the school, without considering the type of the school. 














AB 177,410 0.1266 
0.0000151 0.0001 
D 374,085 0.1183 
Source: Own elaboration with data from PISA (2018). 
 
The Column 2 shows that in D model schools there are much more students 
than in AB model schools. The Column 3 displays the ESCS mean for both school 
models. Here the results may be confusing considering the previous Table 6, but 
we have to take a look to the number of students. Then, we can understand that 




the AB schools have more ESCS mean. To finish, the language of the school is 
not relevant to explain the Income Segregation of the Basque Country. 
On the one hand, these results may clash with other paper’s results. The 
reason could be that the ESCS is not a good income proxy. On the other hand, it 
would be accurate to make a disaggregated analysis of the provinces of the 




























In this work we have analysed the school income segregation by regions and 
type of schools for Spain in 2018. To obtain the results, we have used data of 
PISA, which creates the ESCS index that we have used as a proxy for the income 
level of families. As the ESCS value is standardized by PISA, we needed an 
invariant and absolute index. 
There are several papers in the literature dealing with the income segregation, 
but we have not adapted ethnic segregation indices to measure the income 
segregation as others do. We have adapted the ethnic segregation axioms to the 
income segregation. The index we have used for the analysis is the Variance 
Separation Index, that is the only index that fulfils the axioms we have adapted 
from ethnic segregation axioms. This index measures the variance between 
schools to measure the income segregation. 
The results of the analysis show that there exists low income segregation. On 
the one hand, for Spain, only the 25% of the total inequality is explained by the 
inequality between schools. On the other hand, the reason of that segregation 
level may be the segregation between type of schools, such as for Asturias, 
Canary Islands, Castile La Macha or Valencian Community, where more than the 
50% of the between school segregation is explained by type of school 
segregation. 
To finish, we affirm that in Spain for year 2018, the main reason of the income 
inequality was within schools, that is, rich and poor pupils did not attend different 
schools but they were mixed among them. Moreover, the language model of the 
school explains 28% of the Income Segregation of the Basque Country. 
For further research it could be interesting to try to understand better the ESCS 
values. In the PISA database there is data about the number of students that 
belong to socioeconomically disadvantaged homes and the competitions of 
schools in areas, for example. 
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